Tribunals have great potential to improve access to justice in Canada, and the goal of this article is to better understand this potential. It begins by defining “tribunals” and “access to justice,” the key concepts of this article. Because tribunals and trial courts are functional alternatives for the resolution of many legal disputes, the article first reviews the merits of Canada’s trial-level courts in terms of creating access to justice. It then turns to tribunals, reviewing some objective evidence of tribunal excellence in this regard.
Four key attributes of tribunals make them advantageous alternatives to trial-level courts for the accessible and just resolution of many types of legal dispute. First, tribunals are specialized instead of having general jurisdiction. Second, tribunals apply teamwork to dispute-resolution, instead of assigning all responsibility to individual adjudicators. Third, healthy forms of accountability are easier to establish in tribunals than they are in courts. This includes accountability of individual members to the tribunal and accountability of the tribunal to the legislature that created it. Finally, tribunals can be designed for maximal performance in creating access to justice, by contrast to courts which, for good reasons, resist design or reform efforts coming from outside themselves.
The final Part of the article argues that tribunals can advance access to justice not only by taking on dispute-resolution work that courts would otherwise do, but also by offering authoritative legal vindication of rights that would otherwise be abandoned, or resolved in a completely privatized way. The tribunal promise of accessible adjudication can also be expected to improve the quality of settlements, in terms of upholding parties’ substantive legal rights.
(2024) Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice, Vol 37, Page 135.
Tribunals constitute a vitally important part of Canada’s justice system, but their place in the Canadian state is fragile and their essential function is misunderstood. This article explains the need for pro-functional tribunal law, which would position tribunals to consistently deliver on their potential. Differentiating tribunals dedicated to resolving legal disputes from non-tribunal agencies that do other work is the key. Differentiation would advance goals related to specialization, the separation of powers, and democracy in Canada. It would allow tribunals to escape the taint of partiality to government. It would also set the stage for a professionalization and depoliticization of tribunal appointment practices, securing tribunals and their users from the type of dysfunction that has recently plagued Ontario’s tribunals. The final Part of the paper argues that the Canada’s legislatures, rather than its appellate courts, are the most promising venue for the adoption of pro-functional tribunal law.
A Bill recently introduced to Ontario’s Legislature can tangibly relieve the crisis of access to justice and politicization in the province’s tribunals, and blaze a path to better appointments for adjudicators and judges across the country. The Fewer Backlogs and Less Partisan Tribunals Act was introduced by Liberal MPP Ted Hsu, and will be debated in the Ontario Legislature on April 18th.
Ontario’s high-volume tribunals — especially the Landlord & Tenant Board, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, and the Automobile Accident Benefits Service — have been afflicted by dire access to justiceproblems in recent years. The root cause of the notorious dysfunction was the Ford government’s decision to refuse reappointment to almost everyone initially hired before the 2018 change of government. This deprived tribunals of their most experienced leaders and members. Politicization has also undermined tribunals’ internal culture and made it much more difficult to attract high-quality replacements for those who were dismissed. This was compounded by the provincial government’s rash decisions to force all hearings online and adopt a flawed and untested case management system.
Ted Hsu’s Fewer Backlogs and Less Partisan Tribunals Act seeks to place tribunals permanently on a sounder footing, by insulating them from politicization and purges. It would establish an Adjudicative Tribunal Justice Council, the leaders of which would include retired judges, experienced administrative lawyers, and representatives of the public. Most members of the Council would be appointed not by elected officials but rather by nonprofit groups that understand and care about administrative justice.[1]
The Adjudicative Tribunal Justice Council would, in turn, take the lead in ensuring that Ontario’s tribunals are efficient, speedy, and professional. The Bill would mandate the Council to monitor tribunal operations, and to identify problems and solutions. Perhaps most importantly, the Council would also vet recruitment plans for tribunal members and Chairs. Here, the priority would be on finding highly meritorious, diverse, and professional people who can do the challenging but essential work of resolving disputes and adjudicating.
Cabinet officials would still make the final appointments, but they would have to act quickly on the Council’s recommendations and explicitly justify any refusal to follow them. The Bill also guarantees that, once initially appointed, hardworking and high-performing tribunal members would no longer be subject to politically motivated termination. That fate has befallen many in Ontario in the years since 2018.
For Hsu, who represents Kingston and the Islands, hearing from people again and again who have suffered from tribunal delays i motivated him to introduce the Bill. Hsu’s Fewer Backlogs and Less Partisan Tribunals Act draws on a Model Act drafted by Ron Ellis, who was the leading champion of administrative tribunal justice in Canada before his passing on December 3rd, 2023.
A Better Alternative to Cabinet-Dominated Appointments?
Problematic executive-branch appointments of judges have been in the news at both the provincial and federal levels:
Premier Doug Ford has politicized Ontario Court of Justice appointments, by stacking the Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee with partisan appointees, while also publicly demanding that judges incarcerate more people.
Federal judicial appointments have proved problematic for a different reason, namely struggles to fill judicial vacancies quickly. The Federal Court has taken the very unusual step of castigating the Federal government for this.
The Fewer Backlogs and Less Partisan Tribunals Act may point the way to an appointment process which is professional rather than political, and which is likely to be speedy and efficient as well. While this Bill applies to tribunals rather than courts, tribunals are an integral part of the justice system. If passed, the FBLPTA will ensure that the entities that hear the most common civil disputes (tribunals) will benefit from an apolitical, efficient process for appointments. Section 14(4) of the Bill requires the executive branch to appoint Members recommended by the Council within 60 days, or give reasons for declining to do so.
This Bill won’t fix Ontario’s tribunals mess right away, but it will create a secure foundation for tribunal justice in the medium term. In the long term, it might be the beginning of a less political, more reliable way to appoint adjudicators in tribunals and courts, across the country.
________
[1] These are the Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, the Association of Community Legal Clinics of Ontario, the Administrative Law Section of the Ontario Bar Association, and the Federation of Ontario Law Associations.
Imagine suing the federal government without a lawyer, making your case before a neutral adjudicator, and then getting an enforceable decision, on the merits, less than four months later. This may sound like a far-fetched fantasy if you’re familiar with civil litigation in Canada. In our courts, civil lawsuits routinely take 4-5 years to get to adjudication. Legal fees average about $40k per party to get through a 5-day trial. Self-representation is a frustrating and overwhelming ordeal for most people who try it.
And yet the four month path to adjudication is not just an idle fantasy to ponder while you wait 18 months to get your civil motion heard. It describes the Social Security Tribunal of Canada (SST), a federal tribunal established to hear appeals of government decisions regarding benefits. SST litigants can be represented by lawyers, but 75% of them proceed self-represented, sometimes with help from a friend or family member (which is also allowed). The SST procedure and rules were consciously designed to be accessible. “Navigators” employed by the SST help litigants understand the process and prepare for their hearings for the hearing, at no charge. 95% of individuals who use the SST procedure report that they are satisfied by it. When SST decisions are appealed to higher courts, they are seldom overturned.
The SST is recognized as one of the best-functioning tribunals in Canada. (Ontario’s high-volume provincial tribunals, by contrast, are strugglingbadly.). But there are many tribunals in Canada that deliver a level of access to justice which courts cannot match. Tribunals, in the words of Madam Justice Rosalie Abella, are “designed to be less cumbersome, less expensive, less formal and less delayed,” which lets them “resolve disputes in their area of specialization more expeditiously and more accessibly, but no less effectively or credibly” than courts would. The best tribunals provide access (quick, cheap, and low-stress procedure). They do so without sacrificing justice (substantively correct rulings, adherence to procedural justice, and a public and transparent process).
What explains the success of best-in-class tribunals in creating access to justice? Obviously, it has something to do with the nature of the cases that they deal with. These tend to be factually and legally simpler than civil court matters are. And yet tribunals also have three key features that distinguish them from courts and allow them to excel in A2J terms:
Each tribunal is specialized and focuses on a particular type of legal dispute. Most courts have generalist jurisdiction. Even if a court is specialized (e.g. family court) the judges are often generalists who rotate in and out. Thus, tribunals can hire or train people who know all about the law and facts that repeatedly arise in a particular class of dispute. They need not all be lawyers. Non-lawyer tribunal members (who bring very valuable perspectives) can learn the law that they need to know because the tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited.
Tribunals take a measure of institutional responsibility for creating access to justice, instead of simply assigning each case to an individual who must do so single-handedly. Many tribunals assign panels of multiple members to hear matters, not only in an appellate or reconsideration hearings but also at first instance. For tribunals — unlike courts — internal deliberations or peer review prior to release of a tribunal decision, involving members who did not themselves participate in hearing it, are permitted in Canadian law. Tribunal members’ performance can be reviewed and measured against benchmarks (e.g. for prompt release of decisions).
Designability is a third feature of tribunals that distinguishes them from courts. Tribunals can be planned and built from the ground up to maximize their performance in delivering access to justice for a particular class of legal dispute. This is much more difficult for courts, which are constitutionally independent and thus beyond the power of government to redesign.
None of this is meant as a criticism of Canada’s courts. They have different strengths, including Canada’s most brilliant legal minds on the Bench as well as constitutional independence from government. Courts are equipped to do things that tribunals cannot. However tribunals have enormous potential to create access to justice for Canadians, and this potential has not yet been fully tapped.
(2024) Toronto Metropolitan University Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, page 84
Four of Ontario’s highest-volume adjudicative tribunals became seriously dysfunctional in late 2018. Systemic delays of months or years arose, basic procedural rights were abandoned, and substantive miscarriages of justice became common in the fields of residential tenancy, human rights, and entitlement to benefits. This article describes these symptoms, before seeking to diagnose the underlying problem. The proximate cause of the dysfunction was the approach to tribunal appointments taken by the executive branch of Ontario’s government. Members appointed by the previous government were “de-appointed” en masse, and meritorious replacements were not found promptly. Some of these problems began prior to 2018. Shortcomings in the other two branches of Ontario’s government also contributed to the dysfunctionality. The Ontario Legislature’s statute governing adjudicative tribunals, and its committee overseeing appointments, lacked the powers and resources that would be necessary to safeguard them from executive neglect. Meanwhile, Ontario’s courts are not an accessible and proportionate forum to backstop adjudicative tribunals. Moreover, a review of the case law shows that they lack doctrinal tools to hold the Government responsible for systemic delay and counterproductive appointment practices.
Each year, over 100,000 Ontarians seek justice from Tribunals Ontario. This group of people —the size of a small city— includes tenants, landlords, motor vehicle accident victims seeking insurance benefits, people denied disability benefits, and those who believe that their fundamental human rights have been infringed. This group of 100,000 is significantly larger than the number of plaintiffs who start civil lawsuits in the Superior Court of Justice each year. The numbers are similar in other provinces. For most civil rights, tribunals are Canadians’ first and only opportunity to seek authoritative dispute-resolution and enforcement.
Suppose you run a small widget-making business in Ontario. You sent crates of widgets worth $100k to a customer, but they refuse to pay. They say there’s something wrong with the widgets, but you know this isn’t true and you can prove it. The good news is that contract law obliges your customer to pay you, and procedural law allows you to seize their assets to satisfy the debt if they don’t. The bad news is that, if you sue and the other side plays hardball, it will probably take at least four or five years to get the matter to trial. By that point, the mounting toll of wasted hours and legal fees may well have led you to abandon your claim, or settle it for pennies on the dollar. If you do persevere, there’s a good chance your defendant will have disappeared or gone bankrupt by the time you get your judgment.
Improving access to justice is often identified as a goal of reforms to legal procedure. What does access to justice mean in this context? This article proposes that “better access” and “better justice” should be understood as distinct but overlapping goals. Access improves when procedural costs confronting litigants are reduced. Justice has three qualities—substantive justice, procedural justice, and public justice—which legal procedure can produce to a greater or lesser degree. Although access and justice are sometimes in tension as goals for procedural reform, they are also harmonious. Better access to better justice is a worthy goal for procedural reformers. Welfarism is introduced in the final part of the article, as a way to focus access to justice reforms and make the necessary tradeoffs. This article’s argument is illustrated by three procedural reform trends—mandatory mediation, smaller-dollar procedure, and inquisitoriality.
Suppose that “JM” is a Canadian person, who believes that their legal rights have been infringed. The problem might have arisen at work, at home, with a corporation, or with some part of the government. JM has tried to resolve the matter privately with the other side, but got nowhere. Next, JM did some online research and perhaps spoke to a lawyer. It turns out there is a public body that’s supposed to make decisions, and uphold rights, in disputes like JM’s.
