Ontario v Doe: The 30 Hour Lawsuit 

Slaw.ca, May 29 2026 https://www.slaw.ca/2026/05/29/ontario-v-doe-the-30-hour-lawsuit/

If you think civil lawsuits take way too long in Canada, you’re in goodcompany. But one high-profile suit recently went from claim to final hearing in less than 30 hours. Ontario v Doe was certainly an unusual case, and one that has been widely debated for reasons that have nothing to do with civil procedure. And yet it also offers three important lessons for people who care about making justice speedier in mainstream civil litigation.

The Facts: A Last-Minute Injunction

rally was planned for the afternoon of Saturday March 14th, on University Avenue in downtown Toronto. Just before 3pm on the day before (March 13), Ontario Premier Doug Ford announced that he would instruct the Attorney General to seek an injunction forbidding the rally.

Ontario’s application record and factum were sent to the Superior Court of Justice at 10:52 a.m. the next morning. Responding materials from the event organizers arrived at 11:44 a.m.

The Hearing: in a Hurry

The oral hearing started before Justice Robert Centa at noon, just three hours before the rally was planned to begin.

An awkward moment occurred early on. The law is clear that Attorneys-General are to act independently, and yet the Premier had told the Province the day before that he had “instructed” the AG to bring the application that was now being brought. Justice Centa asked about this, and accepted the representation of the AG’s lawyer that the decision to bring the application was the AG’s alone.

After two hours of submissions and questions, Justice Centa dismissed the Attorney General’s application at 2:05 pm. His Honour’s written reasons were released before the end of the day.

The Decision

Justice Centa found “no evidence” in the record that the rally would attract or encourage violence, or that it would create any material risk of injury (at para 21). Freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed by section 2(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the police were already mandated to respond to any criminality that might occur. For these reasons, the application to pre-emptively cancel the rally was dismissed.

The premise of the decision — that the police would be able to handle any problems arising from the rally — seems to have been vindicated. Two individuals involved in a counter-protestwere arrested for relatively minor offences, but media accounts of indicate no injuries or damage to property.

Why Ontario v. Doe Matters: not for Con Law, but for Civ Pro

The case will not make it into any constitutional law books. No new law was developed, and it wasn’t a “close call” delineating the boundaries of the law. A quia timet injunction against Charter-protected assembly requires strong evidence, and according to Jutice Centa’s reasons the applicant’s record came nowhere close.

However, I do plan to teach Ontario v. Doe in my civil procedure class, for two reasons.

1. A Minimum Viable Product for Civil Procedure?

First, it proves just how quickly a case can get from “glimmer in the client’s eye” to final adjudication. Slowness is considered by many to be the biggest problem with the civil justice system in Canada.

Ontario’s Civil Rules Review is trying to cut the timeline-to-trial for the average civil case in half, from the current 4 or 5 years down to 24 months. Some observers doubt this is possible, without a major infusion of new judicial resources.

Ontario v Doe demonstrated that justice can be done in about 30 hours, or roughly 1/700th of the average time-to-trial sought by the Civil Rules Review. Of course it was an exceptional case, a purported emergency, and the procedure applied to it was not as thorough as it might have been. And yet, this procedure might be considered a “minimum viable product” for those trying to devise a workflow for civil lawsuits that is both quick and just.

In software development, the minimum viable product is the version stripped down to only its most essential elements. After an MVP is developed, more features can be added, if and only if their benefit can be proven to justify the costs they add in time and money.

Ontario v Doe included the essential bits of civil procedure: pleadings, evidence, argument, adjudication, and written reasons.

An interesting experiment would be to start with Ontario v Doe’s 30-hour procedure and then determine the necessary additions to make it viable for a broader variety of cases, instead of trying to find stages that can be cut from the current five-year timeline.

2. A Benchmark for Quick Work?

The blistering pace of Ontario v Doe might also be a useful benchmark, for evaluating the more leisurely efforts of justice system participants in other cases.

  • Justice Centa drafted written reasons, which seem reasonably thorough to this reader, in six hours after the hearing on March 14th. Must we really allow six months (730 times as long) as the timeline for judges to release written reasons, as do the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles (at page 27)?
  • If the lawyers in Ontario v Doe prepared serviceable factums overnight, should any factum require dozens of billable hours, stretching over many weeks, for counsel to prepare?

The answer to both these questions might be “yes.” And yet this model of speedy justice switches the onus to justify more time-consuming efforts, in a provocative and helpful way.

3. Why People Litigate

The third lesson from Ontario v Doe, for students of civil procedure, is about why civil claims are brought in the first place. Civil procedure assumes that, in general, a party litigates because they believe their position has legal merit. It also assumes that parties are interested in settling, and will welcome opportunities to do on a reasonable basis.

Ontario v Doe is a reminder that some civil claimants don’t want to settle, may not believe they are correct in law, and may not even want to win. They may be litigating mostly to send a message to a group or constituency not directly involved in the case.

Starting a lawsuit can:

(i) Garner political or material support from other opponents of the defendant,

(ii) Make the claimant appear to be a victim of wrongdoing or agent of justice, and/or

(iii) Deflect critical attention away from the claimant’s own conduct, toward the defendant.

Pursuing such goals is more attractive if, as in Ontario v Doe, the legal fees can be paid by someone else (i.e. the taxpayers of Ontario). Such a litigation strategy would also be made more attractive by the fact that, for reasons that not entirely clear to the author, Justice Centa made no costs award against the unsuccessful applicant.

Going to Court in Good Faith?

There are a few reasons to question whether this particular application might have been not only unfounded in law, but also brought in less-than-impeccable-faith:

  • If Ontario genuinely believed the rally posed a threat to public safety or fostered hate speech, it could have brought its injunction application much sooner than 24 hours beforehand. The timing of the March 14 rally was predictable, given that its predecessor events had occurred every year in Toronto for over a decade.
  • If seeking in good faith to protect public safety, Ontario would probably have sought to negotiate with the rally organizers to address its concerns on a consensual basis, before resorting to litigation.
  • It could also have introduced legislation to refine the balance between Charter freedoms and public safety or the prevention of hate speech, not only for this protest, but for all others going forward.

The loss in court might not have been unanticipated or even unwelcome. The Premier was able to declare himself “extremely disappointed” in the outcome, and file the government’s “effort” to prevent the rally for future highly targeted political communications. The entire episode seemed to be complete in one news cycle, until a new chapter unexpectedly dropped in May of 2026. The organizers of the rally are now suing the Premier for defamation, based on the March 13th news conference which started it all.

For civil-proceduralists, the good news from Ontario v Doe is that it is possible in principle to do civil justice much faster than we are doing it in the average case today. The bad news is that starting civil lawsuits will always be appealing to some whose motives are far indeed from the legitimate purpose of civil procedure.

A Charter Right to Advise – Even Without a License?

Slaw.ca Access to Justice Column, February 2 2023

Found online at: https://www.slaw.ca/2023/02/02/a-charter-right-to-advise-even-without-a-license/

A new American case, Upsolve v. James, suggests that freedom of expression might protect the right of non-lawyers to offer legal advice.

In both Canada and the USA, lawyers have a near-monopoly on legal advice. If anyone tells someone else how the law would apply to their circumstances, the first person is probably deemed to be “practicing law.” That is something that only lawyers are allowed to do.

Continue reading “A Charter Right to Advise – Even Without a License?”

On a Slow Train to Nowhere: Paralegal Family Law Practice in Ontario

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, August 11, 2022

Found online at: https://www.slaw.ca/2022/08/11/on-a-slow-train-to-nowhere-paralegal-family-law-practice-in-ontario/

Every year, tens of thousands of Ontarians go through divorce or separation. Should these people have access to family law services provided by non-lawyers? What if these service-providers were paralegals trained in family law, insured, and regulated by the Law Society of Ontario?

Continue reading “On a Slow Train to Nowhere: Paralegal Family Law Practice in Ontario”

Online and In-Person Hearings: The Best of Both Worlds

Slaw.ca Civil Procedure Column, June 9, 2022

Found online at: https://www.slaw.ca/2022/06/09/online-and-in-person-hearings-the-best-of-both-worlds/

For a while during the pandemic, online hearings were the only option for courts and tribunals. Justice was done on Zoom, or else it wasn’t done at all.

Now, as we emerge from the age of Covid (knock on wood!), online vs. in-person is a recurring controversy across Ontario’s justice sector. After the Superior Court of Justice ordered most contested family law matters to return to court, a group of family bar lawyers organized in defence of the online option. By contrast, the Landlord and Tenant Board is insisting on fully online practice, while the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario states that “going digital has been a failure” and calls for a return to in-person hearings. The online vs in-person controversy is also litigated on a case-by-case basis. For many civil trials, in the absence of party consent an expensive procedural motion may be necessary to resolve the question of online vs. in-person.

Continue reading “Online and In-Person Hearings: The Best of Both Worlds”

Welfare-Consequentialism: A Vaccine for Populism?

The Political Quarterly, July 2020

            Live press conferences about the coronavirus pandemic have proved remarkably popular in many countries.  To fans of these spectacles, two character types have become familiar.  First, there is the populist leader, personified by Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Victor Orban among others. Their performances have hit many of the same notes that they did before the pandemic: denunciations of elites and foreigners, interspersed with tributes to common people and their common sense remedies. However a second type of character is equally prominent on pandemic press conference stages: the public health expert, replete with academic credentials, speaking the language of evidence-based policy.

Continue reading “Welfare-Consequentialism: A Vaccine for Populism?”

Review of Matthew D. Adler’s “Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction.” New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, 337 pp.

Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Spring 2020) https://ejpe.org/journal/article/view/442

My review of a terrific new book, offering a way to make public policy decisions objectively and ethically.  The book is here.

Review:

Continue reading “Review of Matthew D. Adler’s “Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction.” New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, 337 pp.”

Good Enough for Government Work? Life-Evaluation and Public Policy

The Journal of Happiness Studies, 2019, Volume 21, 30 pgs.

A life-evaluation question asks a person to quantify his or her overall satisfaction with life, at the time when the question is asked. If the goal of public policy is to make individuals’ lives better, does it follow that maximizing aggregate life-evaluations constitutes policy success? This paper argues that life-evaluation data provides a solid basis for welfare-consequentialist policy-making. This is illustrated by the successful argument for expanding state-funded mental health services in the United Kingdom.

However, life-evaluations do not always provide a complete account of individual welfare. Policy-makers therefore must sometimes inquire into the extent to which individuals’ preferences would be fulfilled, if different policies were to be adopted. This article proposes synthesizing life-evaluationist and preferentist data about individual welfare, as a basis for rational policy-making.

Full text:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3397151

The British Invasion: Legal Services Regulation Edition

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, April 10, 2020.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2020/04/10/the-british-invasion-legal-services-regulation-edition/

Bringing British things across the pond is a hot Canadian trend. Prince Harry and Megan Markle are now our most famous immigrants. A Canada-U.K. free trade deal has apparently become a post-Brexit priority. And the Downton Abbey movie has raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from my parents and their friends.

While we’re at it, we should copy at least three aspects of legal services regulation as practiced in our erstwhile mother country. The U.K. has swept away many of the outdated and unnecessary restrictions on legal services that we still cling to. The payoff is better access to justice, without any apparent diminution in quality or ethics. Continue reading “The British Invasion: Legal Services Regulation Edition”

Harassment in the Legal Profession: A Few Bad Apples?

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, February 24, 2020.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2020/02/24/harassment-in-the-legal-profession-a-few-bad-apples/

Far too many people who work in law firms are subject to harassment by lawyers and paralegals. What, if anything, should our law societies do about this? Much depends on whether one sees the problem as “bad apples,” or as symptomatic of problems with the entire “barrel” which is the legal profession in Canada.

“Harassment” is defined by the Ontario Human Rights Code as “a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.” Harassment is often (but not always) sexual in nature. It is distinct from discrimination, but is often based on prohibited grounds of discrimination such as gender, race, or disability. Harassment is distinct from assault (which requires touching), but in many cases the harassing course of conduct includes assault.

Once you start paying attention, evidence of harassment in law firms is not hard to find. Every month, approximately 15 complaints are made to the Law Society of Ontario’s Discrimination and Harassment Counsel (DHC) , regarding alleged discrimination or harassment by a member of the legal profession. Sexual harassment is the most common complaint to the DHC, representing a quarter of the complaints. Racial harassment is also commonly recorded in this data. In a recent Globe & Mail article, Jocelyn Downie and Elaine Craig remind readers that Gerald Regan, a famous lawyer and former Premier of Nova Scotia, has been accused of sexual harassment and assault by more than 35 women. His success seems to suggest that this conduct is still taken lightly in many quarters. Continue reading “Harassment in the Legal Profession: A Few Bad Apples?”

Dispatches From the Front Lines of Canadian Legal Ethics

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, December 16, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/12/16/dispatches-from-the-front-lines-of-canadian-legal-ethics/

On October 25 & 26, Windsor Law proudly hosted the 2019 conference of the Canadian Association for Legal Ethics. The presentations touched on many of the most important issues confronting the legal profession today. Check out the brief summaries below to stay up to date. Continue reading “Dispatches From the Front Lines of Canadian Legal Ethics”

Get It in Writing: Legal Fees, Retainer Contracts and Newell v. Sax

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, October 3, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/10/03/get-it-in-writing-legal-fees-retainer-contracts-and-newell-v-sax/

Should a lawyer decide how much his client should pay him, and then write himself a cheque for that amount, without the client’s agreement? Is a discretionary judicial decision about the value of a legal service an adequate substitute for an agreement between lawyer and client? In Newell v. Sax, the Ontario Court of Appeal effectively answered “yes” to both of these questions. In my view, arbitrary fees invented by lawyers, or judges, are a grave and unnecessary threat to legal ethics. The law should insist on upfront disclosure and clear contractual agreements about legal fees, absent very exceptional circumstances. Continue reading “Get It in Writing: Legal Fees, Retainer Contracts and Newell v. Sax”

The Absent Ethics of Legal Fees : Putting Profit-Seeking in Its Place

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, August 14, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/08/14/the-absent-ethics-of-legal-fees-putting-profit-seeking-in-its-place/

A lawyer should be a loyal ally for a person with a legal need. This loyalty is at the core of our profession’s value proposition to society. Thus, legal ethics strives to guarantee devoted service to clients. Conflict of interest rules prohibit all situations creating “substantial risk” that the lawyer’s loyalty to a client “would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interest.” Lawyers, as fiduciaries, must be “concerned solely for the beneficiary [client]’s interests, never the fiduciary [lawyer]’s own.”

There is, however, a glaring exception to the duty of selfless loyalty to clients. Lawyers are allowed to pursue their own pecuniary interests in collecting fees, at the expense of the clients who pay them. When a lawyer acts to obtain fees from a client, (s)he is clearly not acting as a fiduciary who puts the beneficiary’s interest first.

Everyone deserves to be paid for their work, and without the profit motive very few legal services would be made available to anyone. However, legal ethics must reconcile lawyers’ self-interested pursuit of fees with the general prohibition of conflicts of interest, and with the generally fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Continue reading “The Absent Ethics of Legal Fees : Putting Profit-Seeking in Its Place”