Dr. Dianne Saxe: Climate changes Everything

hosted by Noel Semple

Monday October 19, 7pm, via Zoom

Dr. Dianne Saxe is one of Canada’s leading environmental lawyers. In 2015 she was appointed Environmental Commissioner of Ontario by Premier Kathleen Wynne. She served in that position until 2019.

Dr. Saxe has been a leading voice calling attention to the climate emergency, and identifying constructive policy options for responding to it.

Please join us for this online conversation hosted by Noel Semple of the Etobicoke-Lakeshore Provincial Liberal Association.

Topics will include carbon pricing, climate-related litigation, and how to discuss climate change with voters.

Monday, October 19 2020, 7pm.

Click here to join online: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/9504051646?pwd=K1VlRDR0c0RtM0RwcUVxSlY3emxqUT09

To join by phone: dial 647 374 4685 (Toronto local)

Find your local number: https://us02web.zoom.us/u/kcPbQeRVXK

Meeting ID: 950 405 1646

Passcode: 770001

A Good Day for Self-Regulation: The LSO’s Family Law Paralegal Proposal

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, July 30, 2020

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2020/07/30/a-good-day-for-self-regulation-the-lsos-family-law-paralegal-proposal/

Paralegals have been licensed to independently offer legal services in Ontario since 2007. Their current scope of practice includes tribunal and small claims matters, provincial offences, and some other legal needs. Last month, the Law Society of Ontario’s Family Law Working Group proposed that paralegals, with special training, be allowed to offer family law services as well.

The scope of practice proposed for paralegals in family law is surprisingly broad. I had expected that it might be confined to guideline child support, straightforward parenting orders, and uncontested divorces. In fact, it extends to spousal support and matrimonial property division (except in some financially complicated and high-net-worth cases). Despite the lawyer opposition that this proposal is sure to encounter, a broad scope of paralegal family law practice may become reality. If so then cynics (like me), who suspected that the lawyer-controlled Law Society would never take the initiative to significantly expand paralegal practice, will have to reconsider.

A Normative Framework for Scope of Practice

The Family Law Working Group deserves applause for this brave proposal. Whether it has identified the right scope of practice is a more difficult question. My view is that the Law Society should act so as to maximize the aggregate welfare of consumers, and would-be consumers, of legal services.

  • broader scope of paralegal practice means more options and more competition — and therefore lower prices — for legal services. It also increases the number of individuals willing to make the investment necessary to obtain the paralegal family law license
  • Conversely, a narrower scope would mean that things like spousal support and matrimonial property division would remain reserved for lawyers. Family lawyers typically have more training than paralegals. (Although it is interesting to note that a licensed Ontario lawyer can offer any family law services whatsoever despite never having taken any family law courses whatsoever outside, of the bar admission process). Requiring a full lawyer license might mean better quality, along with higher prices, for consumers of these services.

From this welfare-consequentialist standpoint, defining license scope is a balancing act between consumer interests in price, quality, and choice. Did the Working Group strike the right balance? The data necessary to scrutinize their choices does not seem to be available at this time. However the Working Group’s document does describe what seems to be a rigorous consultation process, including meetings with more than 100 practitioners, experts, and psychometricians (which is a word that I had to look up).

Let us assume that there is an objectively correct scope of paralegal family law practice, and that is the scope that will maximize the overall welfare of consumers. Perhaps the Working Group has accurately predicted and laid out that scope, based on their consultation process. However it is also possible that predicting the correct scope — even approximately — is inherently impossible ex ante.  If so, then the LSO should be prepared to gather data about the experiences of family legal services consumers, and use that data to revise scopes of practice over time.

On the Demand Side

For prospective paralegal family law practitioners, the “juice” (career opportunities) must be worth the “squeeze” (tuition and time investment to acquire the license). The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician program was recently abolished.
Protectionist lawyers or reactionist regulators in that state might be part of the explanation, but there was also very limited take-up of the program. Five years after its inception in 2015, this it had attracted only 40 practitioners. If the licensing requirements are too onerous, and/or the scope of practice is too narrow, the LSO’s paralegal family law practice experiment could meet a similar fate. It is very good to see that the Consultation Paper considers these demand-side issues, adopting “Viability” of the program as one of its guiding principles.

Competition, and Social Responsibility to the Disrupted

What about Ontario’s family lawyers? There is every reason to believe that most of them offer high-quality, highly professional services to their clients. What if the new paralegal family law license dramatically undercuts demand for their services ? What if paralegals offer services comparable to those of family lawyers, at prices low enough to significantly disrupt the market? This fear, often unspoken, underlies much lawyer opposition to paralegal practice.

The threat to lawyers may be hypothetical, or overblown. The primary market for the new paralegal practitioners may turn out to be currently self-represented people, not people currently represented by lawyers. Some, or most, family lawyers might experience new competition from paralegals, but respond in a way that leaves them doing just as well as they were before. My research with family law and other personal plight lawyers has convinced me that the stereotype of lawyers as devoted to tradition, and unwilling to experiment with new practice models, has little basis in fact.

Still, new competition can certainly devastate workers through no fault of their own. Suppose that Floyd the family lawyer has jumped through all the currently necessary regulatory hurdles in order to offer family law services. These hurdles include 7 years of education, large tuition bills and student debts, the articling crapshoot, etc. Acting in good faith, Floyd has made an enormous personal investment in being able to help people going through separation. Now suppose that Floyd’s ability to earn a living from his investment in legal education is greatly undermined by the new paralegal competition. Floyd loses his job as a family law associate. He hangs out a shingle, but there is simply much less client work available now that paralegals are in the market.

Would that be fair to Floyd? Not really. Something should be done to help lawyers who wind up in this sort of position. That may be a job for the Law Society. However the issue is not really lawyer-specific. It’s part of the bigger public policy problem of how we as a society respond to fluctuations in the demand for labour of all kinds. Floyd is really in the same boat as the auto plant worker laid off because of foreign competition, the vehicle operator replaced by self-driving technology, and the waiter laid off due to Covid-19. Government must help such people with retraining programs, unemployment insurance, wage loss insurance, earned-income tax credits, and so forth.

However concern for the disrupted must not distract the Law Society from its clear statutory mandate to make decisions with exclusive regard to the public interest. If Convocation adopts the Family Law Working Group’s proposal for paralegal family law practice — or something similar to it — then it will be fulfilling this public interest obligation, in accordance with the best traditions of self-regulation.

The Law Society’s Family Legal Services Provider consultation is open until November 30, 2020.

Welfare-Consequentialism: A Vaccine for Populism?

The Political Quarterly, July 2020

            Live press conferences about the coronavirus pandemic have proved remarkably popular in many countries.  To fans of these spectacles, two character types have become familiar.  First, there is the populist leader, personified by Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Victor Orban among others. Their performances have hit many of the same notes that they did before the pandemic: denunciations of elites and foreigners, interspersed with tributes to common people and their common sense remedies. However a second type of character is equally prominent on pandemic press conference stages: the public health expert, replete with academic credentials, speaking the language of evidence-based policy.

Continue reading “Welfare-Consequentialism: A Vaccine for Populism?”

Review of Matthew D. Adler’s “Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction.” New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, 337 pp.

Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Spring 2020) https://ejpe.org/journal/article/view/442

My review of a terrific new book, offering a way to make public policy decisions objectively and ethically.  The book is here.

Review:

Continue reading “Review of Matthew D. Adler’s “Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction.” New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, 337 pp.”

Good Enough for Government Work? Life-Evaluation and Public Policy

The Journal of Happiness Studies, 2019, Volume 21, 30 pgs.

A life-evaluation question asks a person to quantify his or her overall satisfaction with life, at the time when the question is asked. If the goal of public policy is to make individuals’ lives better, does it follow that maximizing aggregate life-evaluations constitutes policy success? This paper argues that life-evaluation data provides a solid basis for welfare-consequentialist policy-making. This is illustrated by the successful argument for expanding state-funded mental health services in the United Kingdom.

However, life-evaluations do not always provide a complete account of individual welfare. Policy-makers therefore must sometimes inquire into the extent to which individuals’ preferences would be fulfilled, if different policies were to be adopted. This article proposes synthesizing life-evaluationist and preferentist data about individual welfare, as a basis for rational policy-making.

Full text:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3397151

The British Invasion: Legal Services Regulation Edition

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, April 10, 2020.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2020/04/10/the-british-invasion-legal-services-regulation-edition/

Bringing British things across the pond is a hot Canadian trend. Prince Harry and Megan Markle are now our most famous immigrants. A Canada-U.K. free trade deal has apparently become a post-Brexit priority. And the Downton Abbey movie has raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from my parents and their friends.

While we’re at it, we should copy at least three aspects of legal services regulation as practiced in our erstwhile mother country. The U.K. has swept away many of the outdated and unnecessary restrictions on legal services that we still cling to. The payoff is better access to justice, without any apparent diminution in quality or ethics. Continue reading “The British Invasion: Legal Services Regulation Edition”

Harassment in the Legal Profession: A Few Bad Apples?

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, February 24, 2020.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2020/02/24/harassment-in-the-legal-profession-a-few-bad-apples/

Far too many people who work in law firms are subject to harassment by lawyers and paralegals. What, if anything, should our law societies do about this? Much depends on whether one sees the problem as “bad apples,” or as symptomatic of problems with the entire “barrel” which is the legal profession in Canada.

“Harassment” is defined by the Ontario Human Rights Code as “a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.” Harassment is often (but not always) sexual in nature. It is distinct from discrimination, but is often based on prohibited grounds of discrimination such as gender, race, or disability. Harassment is distinct from assault (which requires touching), but in many cases the harassing course of conduct includes assault.

Once you start paying attention, evidence of harassment in law firms is not hard to find. Every month, approximately 15 complaints are made to the Law Society of Ontario’s Discrimination and Harassment Counsel (DHC) , regarding alleged discrimination or harassment by a member of the legal profession. Sexual harassment is the most common complaint to the DHC, representing a quarter of the complaints. Racial harassment is also commonly recorded in this data. In a recent Globe & Mail article, Jocelyn Downie and Elaine Craig remind readers that Gerald Regan, a famous lawyer and former Premier of Nova Scotia, has been accused of sexual harassment and assault by more than 35 women. His success seems to suggest that this conduct is still taken lightly in many quarters. Continue reading “Harassment in the Legal Profession: A Few Bad Apples?”

Dispatches From the Front Lines of Canadian Legal Ethics

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, December 16, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/12/16/dispatches-from-the-front-lines-of-canadian-legal-ethics/

On October 25 & 26, Windsor Law proudly hosted the 2019 conference of the Canadian Association for Legal Ethics. The presentations touched on many of the most important issues confronting the legal profession today. Check out the brief summaries below to stay up to date. Continue reading “Dispatches From the Front Lines of Canadian Legal Ethics”

Get It in Writing: Legal Fees, Retainer Contracts and Newell v. Sax

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, October 3, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/10/03/get-it-in-writing-legal-fees-retainer-contracts-and-newell-v-sax/

Should a lawyer decide how much his client should pay him, and then write himself a cheque for that amount, without the client’s agreement? Is a discretionary judicial decision about the value of a legal service an adequate substitute for an agreement between lawyer and client? In Newell v. Sax, the Ontario Court of Appeal effectively answered “yes” to both of these questions. In my view, arbitrary fees invented by lawyers, or judges, are a grave and unnecessary threat to legal ethics. The law should insist on upfront disclosure and clear contractual agreements about legal fees, absent very exceptional circumstances. Continue reading “Get It in Writing: Legal Fees, Retainer Contracts and Newell v. Sax”

The Absent Ethics of Legal Fees : Putting Profit-Seeking in Its Place

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, August 14, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/08/14/the-absent-ethics-of-legal-fees-putting-profit-seeking-in-its-place/

A lawyer should be a loyal ally for a person with a legal need. This loyalty is at the core of our profession’s value proposition to society. Thus, legal ethics strives to guarantee devoted service to clients. Conflict of interest rules prohibit all situations creating “substantial risk” that the lawyer’s loyalty to a client “would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interest.” Lawyers, as fiduciaries, must be “concerned solely for the beneficiary [client]’s interests, never the fiduciary [lawyer]’s own.”

There is, however, a glaring exception to the duty of selfless loyalty to clients. Lawyers are allowed to pursue their own pecuniary interests in collecting fees, at the expense of the clients who pay them. When a lawyer acts to obtain fees from a client, (s)he is clearly not acting as a fiduciary who puts the beneficiary’s interest first.

Everyone deserves to be paid for their work, and without the profit motive very few legal services would be made available to anyone. However, legal ethics must reconcile lawyers’ self-interested pursuit of fees with the general prohibition of conflicts of interest, and with the generally fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Continue reading “The Absent Ethics of Legal Fees : Putting Profit-Seeking in Its Place”

Tort Litigation and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Changing the Climate of Opinion

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, June 6, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/06/06/tort-litigation-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions-changing-the-climate-of-opinion/

Climate change is probably the single greatest threat to the security and prosperity of Canadians, as well as the rest of the human race. The most effective, least painful way to mitigate climate change is to impose a price on greenhouse gases worldwide, either through carbon taxes or tradable emission permits. However, carbon pricing is as politically difficult as it is economically efficient. In most countries, voters and political leaders have so far refused to support prices high enough to keep the risk of catastrophic climate change within an acceptable band. In Canada, there is also real risk that the federal carbon pricing backstop will be derailed on constitutional grounds. Continue reading “Tort Litigation and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Changing the Climate of Opinion”

A Tale of Two Attorneys-General: Jody Wilson-Raybould and Caroline Mulroney

Slaw.ca Legal Ethics Column, April 10, 2019.

Found online at: http://www.slaw.ca/2019/04/10/a-tale-of-two-attorneys-general-jody-wilson-raybould-and-caroline-mulroney/

Twice in the last six months, Canadian Attorneys-General have been encouraged to resist the first ministers of their respective governments. Today, federal AG Jody Wilson-Raybould is widely commended for resisting repeated requests from the PM’s office to change tack on the prosecution of SNC-Lavalin (See Patricia Hughes’ comprehensive Slaw post on the affair).

In September of 2018, Ontario AG Caroline Mulroney was called upon to vote against, or resign from, Premier Doug Ford’s government after Ford proposed to invoke section 33 of the Charter. The Superior Court of Justice had found Ford’s plan to reduce the size of Toronto City Council to violate freedom of expression, and Ford announced that he would use the “notwithstanding clause,” if necessary, to override this decision. (The SCJ ruling was quickly overturned on appeal, making section 33 unnecessary).

What do these two cases have in common, and what sets them apart? Continue reading “A Tale of Two Attorneys-General: Jody Wilson-Raybould and Caroline Mulroney”